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In 1818, the United States Supreme Court ended the year's term 
without rendering a decision in the case that would become the 
foundation for the protection of corporate property rights from state 
intervention: Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward.1 From the 
inception of the controversy to the reading of Justice Marshall's opinion 
on the opening day of the Supreme Court's term in 1819, Justice 
Joseph Story played a critical role in molding the Dartmouth College 
case into a solid foundation for the "protection to private property 
against the authority of the government--a principle which became the 
cornerstone of the American doctrine of constitutional government. "2 
Justice Story not only helped create the legal strategy of Dartmouth 
College's chief counsel, Daniel Webster, but his eloquent concurring 
opinion repaired the shortfalls of Chief Justice Marshall's opinion. 
Appointed to the Supreme Court by President Madison, Story wore 
the badge of the.Jeffersonian Republican Party. However, his political 
allegiance to the party was questionable at best. 3 Story wrote in his 
autobiography: 
Though I was a decided member of what was called the Republican 
party, and of course a supporter of the administration of Mr. 
Jefferson and Mr. Madison, you are not to imagine that I was a 
mere slave to the opinions of either, or that I did not exercise an 
117 U.S. 518, 4 Wheat 518, 4 L.Ed 629 (1819). 
2Char1es Grove Haines, The Role of the Sypreme Court jn American Government 
and Politics: 1789-1835 (New York: University of California Press, 1960), 418. 
3Jefferson strongly advised Madison not to appoint Story to the Court, calling him a 
pseudo-Republican. He was appointed only after several others declined Madison's 
offer 
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independent judgment upon public affairs . . . . I was and always 
have been a lover, devoted lover, of the Constitution of the United 
States, and a friend to the Union of States. I never wished to bring 
the government to a mere confederacy of the states; but to 
preserve the power of the general government given by all the 
states, in full exercise and sovereignty for the protection and 
preservation of all the states.4 
Once on the Court, Story proved to be a strong conservative, 
defending the "two great principles of Federalist theory: the rights and 
privileges of Qrivate property and the legitimate powers of the national 
government. "5 
While considered an enemy of property rights by many Federalists, 
Story had shown concern for the protection of private property 
throughout his career as a Salem lawyer.6 Story outraged the southern 
wing of the Republican Party by representing New England claims in 
Fletcher v. Peck to property repossessed by the Georgia legislature. 
Story and co-counsel, Robert Harper, rejected states' rights doctrines 
and demanded protection of private interests through a broad 
interpretation of the contract clause of the Constitution7 in their 
argument presented to and adopted by the Marshall Court. Story 
never "deviated from the letter of party allegiance, yet all his actions 
suggested that here was a man as much Federalist as Republican, 
and perhaps more."8 Story's true commitment to private property rights 
became apparent as the Dartmouth College case unfolded. 
Dartmouth College was originally chartered by the governor of New 
Hampshire, representing the English Crown, in 1769. The charter, 
granted to Reverend Eleazar Wheelock, established a school for 
4 William Wetmore Story, Life and Letters of Joseph Storv, volume I, (New York: 
Books for Library, 1851), 128. 
5 James McClellan, Joseph Storv and the American Constitution (Norman, 
Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1971 ), 194. 
6 Ibid., 195. 
7 Article 1, Section 10 of the United States Constitution: "No state shall pass any 
law impairing the obligation of contracts." The contract clause would be the key to the 
Dartmouth College case. 
8Gerald T. Dunne, Joseph Story: 1812 Overture, Harvard Law Review 77, 245 
(1963). 
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educating Indian children to become Christian m1ss1onaries. The 
charter incorporated Dartmouth College, making Wheelock president 
and creating a board of trustees with the power to govern the 
institution. 9 
In June 1816, almost fifty years after Dartmouth College was 
founded, republican Governor William Plumer led the New Hampshire 
legislature in passing a law that essentially annulled the royal charter of 
Dartmouth College. The school's name was changed to Dartmouth 
University, the board of trustees was enlarged from twelve to twenty-
one (the new members to be appointed by the governor), and the state 
was given the power to regulate the school's curriculum.10 
The original twelve trustees ref used to accept the legislation, 
resolving that "every literary institution in the State will hereafter hold its 
rights, privileges and property, not according to the settled established 
principles of law, but accordin~ to the arbitrary will and pleasure of 
every successive legislature."1 The college, represented by Daniel 
Webster, argued before the New Hampshire Supreme Court that the 
legislation violated both the New Hampshire constitution and the 
federal contract clause. Chief Justice Williarr, Richardson's opinion 
ruled against the college, arguing that although the charter was a 
contract, Dartmouth College was a public institution not protected by 
the contract clause. 12 Richardson, surprisingly a strong Federalist, 
concluded his opinion with a forceful affirmation of judicial review and 
national supremacy, seeming to invite an appeal to the Supreme 
Court.13 The case arrived on a writ of error and was argued at the 
close of the 1818 term. The term ended with the Justices still divided 
on the opinion. 
The importance of the Dartmouth College case was plainly 
understood when it was argued. The Court's decision would define the 
character of the American corporation and that role it would play in the 
economy. It had already been established in Justice Story's opinion in 
9 Edward G. White, History of the Supreme Court of the United States: The 
Marshall Court and Cultural Change. 1815-35 (New York: Macmillan, 1988), 612-13. 
10 McClellan, 200. 
11 White, 613. 
12 A. Kent Newmyer, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story: Statesman of the Old 
Republic (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 130. 
13Dunne, 166. 
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Terret v. Taylor that a charter was considered a contract protected by 
the Constitution.14 The question presented by the Daftmouth College 
case was whether a corporation was public in character and therefore 
subject to legislative regulation. If so, investors would be reluctant to 
buy stocks and the corporation's future bleak. However, if the 
corporation, whose function is often of a public nature, were protected 
from any government intervention, public welfare could be jeopardized. 
When the Court convened on the opening day of the 1819 term, the 
state was prepared for another round of argument, to be delivered by 
its new counsel, William Pickney.15 Chief Justice Marshall, instead, 
announced that the Court had reached a decision on the Daftmouth 
Case and began to read his opinion. Marshall concluded, without 
analysis, that Dartmouth's charter was indeed a contract. Further, that 
Dartmouth College was a private eleemosynary institution, not a public 
one, and, therefore, protected under the contract clause of Article 1. It 
was likewise clear, according to Marshall, that the New Hampshire 
legislation impaired the operation of the college, and thereby violated 
the contract. The state supreme court's decision was reversed. 
Three written opinions were presented. Chief Justice Marshall's 
plurality opinion for the Court obtained the concurrence only of Justice 
William Johnson and H. Brockholst Livingston. Livingston, however, 
also concurred with the separate concurring opinions written by Justice 
Story and Justice Bushrod Washington. Justice Gabriel Duvall 
dissented.16 In short, no opinion commanded a majority of the six 
justices, thus leaving the door open for the lower courts later to follow 
the more persuasive reasoning of Justice Story. 
The role played by Justice Story in the Dartmouth College case 
seemed ordinary in the eyes of the many observers in the Court that 
day. However, Story's influence on Marshall and Story's concurring 
opinion were essential in making a forceful precedent of corporate 
contract law. 
Judging from the events leading up to the arrival of the case on the 
Supreme Court docket, from certain weaknesses in Marshall's 
14 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward. 17 U.S. 518, 4 Wheat 518, 4 
L.Ed .. 629 (1819). Justice Story, concurring. 
15Haines, 402. 
16 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, Justice Story, concurring. 
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opinion, and from the nature of Story's concurring opinion, it seems 
clear that both Marshall and Story regarded the farmer's controlling 
opinion to be somewhat unsatisfactory, and that Story was, in many 
respects, the real genius behind the Dartmouth College decision.17 
Marshall's opinion, while clear and concise, "carried the seeds of 
destruction with it."18 Before Story wrote his concurring opinion, he 
mastered Marshall's reasoning in the case and took note of the 
weaknesses. Filling in the gaps and correcting the mistakes in logic, 
Story answered the shortfalls of Marshall's opinion with common law 
and vested rights theory. 
Marshall's definition of public and private corporations fell short of 
protecting the American corporation. Instead of making a vested rights 
argument, Marshall focused on the contract clause's application to 
Dartmouth College as a private eleemosynary institution. Story, 
however, believed that a general inquiry into all corporations under 
common law was essential to the Dartmouth case. "Here was the 
missing link in Marshall's narrower argument. And from this broad 
approach came Story's doctrine of public and private corporations, 
which was the crucial bridge from private eleemosynary educational 
institutions to the American business corporation."19 Developing 
Marshall's private-public definition, Story reversed the commonwealth 
tradition of defining corporations by the nature of their business. 
Private corporations, he wrote, were businesses whose capital was 
private, regardless of the nature of the corporation. Expanding this 
definition, Story cited several examples: 
Public corporations are generally esteemed such as exist for public 
political purposes only, such as towns, cities, parishes, and 
counties; and in many respects they are so, although they involve 
some private interests; but strictly speaking, public corporations are 
such only as are founded by the government for public purposes .. 
. If, therefore, the foundation be private, though under the charter of 
the government, the corporation is private, however extensive the 
uses may be to which it is devoted, either by the bounty of the 
17McClellan, 202. 
181bid., 204. 
19Newmyer, 131. 
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founder, or the nature of the objects of the institution. For instance, 
a bank created by the government for its own uses, whose stock is 
exclusively owned by the government, is, in the strictest sense, a 
public corporation ... But, a bank, whose stock is owned by private 
persons, is a private corporation, although it is erected by the 
government, and its objects and operations partake a public 
nature.20 
Story realized that government regulation of private corporations would 
make investors hesitate to buy stock. His public-private doctrine was a 
practical response to protect corporations from governmental 
interference. 
Marshall's decision jumped quickly from defining Dartmouth College 
as a private institution to providing protection under the Constitution's 
contract clause. Under this interpretation, Marshall's decision could be 
construed to mean that once a corporation has been created by a 
charter, the legislature can never again effect the business's operation. 
Were that the case, state legislatures would then be hesitant to grant 
charters, causing national economic stagnation. To prevent this, Story 
recognized the possibility of creating "escape clauses" in corporate 
charters, reserving the right to the states to restrict the corporation in 
the future.21 In applying that principle to the case before the Court, 
however, Story noted that no escape clause had been created: 
When a private eleemosynary corporation is thus created by the 
charter of the crown, it is subject to no other control on the part of 
the crown, than what is expressly or implicitly reserved by the 
charter itself. Unless a power be reserved for this purpose, the 
crown cannot, in virtue of its prerogativei without the consent of the 
corporation, alter or amend the charter.2 
Limited to constitutional issues, Marshall avoided developing a 
vested right doctrine in his opinion and instead focused on the contract 
clause. Story's concurring opinion, however, packed common law and 
vested rights theory into the meaning of the contract clause. The 
20Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, Justice Story, concurring. 
21 McClellan, 206. 
22 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, Justice Story, concurring. 
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procedural ntricks" planned by Story and Webster were then 
unnecessary for the Court to include broad vested rights principles in 
their rulings on the contract clause.23 Story thereby avoided criticism 
for basing the Court's decision on vested rights: 
The packing of a textual provision with extraconstitutional principles 
avoided any difficulty that might arise from an appeal to principles 
that were not embodied in textual language. As the stature of 
natural law as a body of principles independent of the positive 
enactments of a nation eroded in the nineteenth century, the 
summoning up of general principles as a basis for a judicial 
decision became more problematic. But if those principles had 
been read into a constitutional provision, the difficulty was 
surmounted.24 
Marshall, in answering an attack on the authority of Dartmouth's 
charter, asserted that all contracts, executed and executory are binding 
on both parties. However, his analysis stopped here, inviting the 
criticism that a "charter which was in the nature .'.>f a license subject to 
revocation at any time become a binding and irrevocable contract .... 
Rights may have become vested through such a contract, but those 
rights are no more sacred than rights which have become vested in 
any other manner.''25 Story again filled in the gap with common law 
and practical reasoning. Once a gift is executed, it must be completely 
irrevocable. Otherwise "in a country like ours, where thousands of land 
titles had their origin in gratuitous grants of the states,"26 such a 
precedent would not only cause general hysteria, but shake the 
country's economic foundation. For common law backing, Story cited 
Fletcher v. Peck as a precedent: 
A contract executed, is one in which the object of the contract is 
performed; and this, says Blackstone, differs in nothing from a 
grant. A contract executed, as well as one that is executory, 
contains obligations binding on the parties. A grant, in its own 
23white, 628. 
241bid., 628. 
25Haines, 407-8. 
26 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, Justice Story, concurring. 
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nature, amounts to an extinguishment of the right of the grantor, 
and implies a contract not to reassert that right.27 
Almost as important, was Story's refutation of Marshall's claim that 
the contract clause only pertained to contracts concerning private 
property. Story expanded the clause to include "all incorporeal 
hereditaments,"28 thereby upholding what he considered to be the full 
spectrum of protection offered by the contract clause. While not 
appearing to criticize Marshall's opinion, Story essentially concluded 
that "Marshall's perfunctory remark was utterly devoid of foundation, 
either in the common law or the meaning and spirit of the 
Constitution. "29 
Story's involvement in the Dartmouth College case goes well beyond 
his concurring opinion. Story, with the cooperation of Daniel Webster, 
was the legal mind behind a plan to ensure that the Supreme Court 
would rule on the vested rights issue. The original suit brought forward 
by Webster involved two primary arguments: that the charter was a 
contract protected by the contract clause of the Constitution and the 
New Hampshire legislature violated that charter; and that the New 
Hampshire constitution granted vested rights of which the college had 
been deprived. Both of these arguments required Dartmouth College 
to be classified as a private corporation, thereby receiving the 
protection of vested rights afforded to an individual. The appellate 
jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, provided in Section 25 
of the 1789 Judiciary Act, however, limited the Court to constitutional 
issues and not "the broader issue of whether a state legislature could 
infringe on vested rights."30 
Story was determined to have the Supreme Court rule on the issue 
of vested rights accrued by private corporations. To do this, Story 
advised Webster to enter three separate suits in Story's circuit court. 
The cases, falling under the diversity of citizenship jurisdiction would 
ensure that both the circuit court and the Supreme Court could 
consider all legal arguments presented by the prosecution. Fulfilling his 
part of the plan, Story and the district judge disagreed pro forma at the 
271bid. 
281bid. 
291n the words of McClellan, 209. 
30White, 175. 
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circuit court level, so that the cases could be taken immediately to the 
Supreme Court. Story dismissed the objections of university counsel's 
arguement that the "ejectment suits were fictitious. . . . One observer 
sympathetic to the university likened Story's action to 'an assumption of 
power equivalent to French despotism,' but found it consistent with 
Story's insistence on continually extending the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts." The three cases, unnecessary after the ruling in Dartmouth, 
were never heard by the Marshall Court. Story, who had anticipated 
that the cases would be heard, had already been working on his 
opinion, circulating it to respected judges for their criticism. Believing 
that vested rights must be included in Dartmouth, Story incorporated 
these writings into his concurring opinion.31 
The ethics of Story's heavy involvement in the Dartmouth case are 
questionable at best. The Story-Webster collaboration pushed the 
limits of ethical standards of any time-period since the formation of the 
United States. Webster, aware that Story was workin~ on his opinion, 
sent sources and citations to the justice for references. 2 Despite these 
questionable ethics, Story's involvement in the Dartmouth case cannot 
be easily judged as inappropriate. In order to achieve the primary 
objective of the Marshall Court, expanding judicial authority, Story's 
involvement was necessary. Further, the historic role played by the 
Marshall Court was that of an active participant in defining the division 
of power in the federal government, not that of a detached moderator. 
"Story's relationship with Webster in Dartmouth College and Marshall's 
surreptitious intervention in Martin may have crossed the line of ethical 
behavior, even by nineteenth-century standards, and there is evidence 
that both Story and Marshall took pains to create a public impression 
that they had approached the Martin and Dartmouth College cases in a 
disinterested fashion."33 Obviously, the justices of the Marshall court 
perceived the role of the federal judiciary differently. Few Supreme 
Court decisions have had a greater impact on American historical 
31 1bid., 177; Newmyer, 131; The investors were residents of another state suing 
Dartmouth University. Story and the federal district judge sitting with him at the circuit 
did not actually disagree on the case. Their choice to issue a certificate of division (a 
statement claiming a disagreement on the appropriate way to rule in the cases) would 
allow the cases to go immediately before the U.S. Supreme Court for consideration. 
The move was purely strategic; Story, 323. Cited from a letter to Story from Judge 
Livingston. 
32White, 618. 
33 1bid., 180 
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development than the Dartmouth College case. The case enhanced 
the prestige of Marshall's court, limited state encroachment on private 
rights, and provided a gateway for the growing role of corporations in 
American history. Story himself saw: "[T]he vital importance, to the 
well-being of society and the security of private rights, of the principles 
on which that decision rested. Unless I am very much mistaken, these 
principles will be found to apply with an extensive reach to all the great 
concerns of the people, and will check any undue encroachments upon 
civil rights, which the passions or the popular doctrines of the day may 
stimulate our State Legislatures to adopt."34 As the corporation 
matured and widespread abuses of the corporate privilege followed, 
later courts allowed increased government regulation at the cost of 
private property rights. Yet, the concern for the protection of property 
rights remains strong--following in the vested rights tradition 
incorporated into American law with the Dartmouth College case. 
The Dartmouth case became a legal instrument exploited by private 
businesses in their quest for prosperity, free of governmental 
interference. By allowing this freedom to the American corporation, the 
Marshall court ensured the economic vitality needed for the growth and 
advancement of a new nation. The Dartmouth case catalyzed the 
relationship between the government and the economy in the ninteenth 
century by allowing the corporate charter to be defined as a contract. 
The ruling allowed the rapid growth of industrial organization and 
"made possible a breadth of application for the clause which would 
have astonished most, if not all, of those who voted for its adoption in 
1787 and 1788."35 While bringing corporations under the protection of 
the contract clause required "correcting" the intent of the men who 
wrote the Constitution, the change was necessary for the survival and 
affluence of American economic expansion. 
The success of constitutionalism can be attributed to the flexibility 
allowed by a "living constitution," adaptable to a changing society. It 
was Story's concurring opinion that took this extra step and provided a 
vested rights doctrine applicable to the American corporation, an entity 
which dominated the evolution of American business. "Thus, it has 
become a virtual convention of economic historiography to begin the 
34Story, 331. Story to Chancellor Kent. 
35Benjamin Fletcher Wright, The Contract Cause of the Constitution (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1938), 39-40. 
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American corporate cycle with Marshall's Dartmouth College opinion, 
and read into it the legal foundations of financial and industrial 
capitalism."36 Marshall merely implied this in his opinion, but Story 
specifically confirr.ied that the ruling should be extended to corporate 
organization. 
The Dartmouth case continued the success of the Marshall Court in 
expanding the power of the national government over states rights. 
Marbury v. Madison and Martin v. Hunter's Lessee took the crucial first 
steps in creating an appropriate division of power in the American 
federal system. While these cases created the federal judiciary's 
authority, it was the Dartmouth case which used this authority to 
protect businesses from the state encroachment. 
Another significant step had been taken to incorporate, by means of 
judicial interpretation, the doctrines of Federalism into our 
constitutional law. The principle of federal supremacy over the 
state courts, as announced in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, and the 
denial of the right of a state to tax an instrumentality of the federal 
government, for the establishment of which there was no express 
warrant in the Constitution in McCulloch v. Maryland, were now 
supplemented b}; a rule which laid a heavy hand upon the exercise 
of state powers. 7 
When Marshall assumed the position of Chief Justice in 1801, he 
understood that his Court must "reinforce the movement toward a 
stronger national government," and that to do this it "would have to 
establish its position as an authoritative interpreter of the 
Constitution."38 Still facing an imbalance in the nation-state 
relationship, the Dartmouth case forced the states to concede to the 
national government the right to dictate the government's authority 
over private enterprise, bringing the balance of sovereignty in the 
federal system closer to effective government. 
The Court understood the need for policy promoting economic 
development and enhancing national authority over the states. Their 
36Gerald T. Dunne, Washington University Law ·Quarterly. "The American 
Blackstone," June 1963, No. 3., 331. 
37Haines, 418-19. 
38R. Kent Newmyer, The Supreme Court under Marshall and Taney (Arlington 
Heights: Cromwell, 1968), 24. 
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response, promoting the Federalist cause in the battle against state 
rights, sacrificed government authority for the sake of corporate rights 
under the contract clause. Justice Story went further, incorporating a 
doctrine of vested rights into the constitutional protection of private 
enterprise. His role in expanding the contract clause ensured the 
success of the Dartmouth decision. With Story's guidance, the Court 
created a legal doctrine which rewrote the contract clause of the 
Constitution into a "living" concept which would adapt to the changing 
needs of society rather than becoming obsolete with age. 
